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European Union Telecommunications Policy 
 
Summary  
This article explores the character and development of telecommunications policy at EU 
level. For most of the 20
th
 century a matter of national governance and thus of peripheral 
interest to the EU, from the mid to late 1980s the EU began to develop an intensified 
policy package for the telecommunications sector. Telecommunications has now grown 
to become one of the most prominent and extensive policy areas addressed by the EU. 
But what can account for such a remarkable Europeanisation of telecommunications 
governance? In polar contrast to its origins, the article shows how telecommunications 
has become a key focus for effecting sectoral  change by advocates of neo-liberal 
economics and policy. This went hand-in-hand with arguments around propounding the 
benefits of economic globalization, which sustained a move to internationalise the 
organization of telecommunications to the European level along neo-liberal lines. 
However, notwithstanding the remarkable growth of the EU governance framework for 
telecommunications, the article also nuances its analysis through illustrating the constant 
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resistance to wholesale Europeanisation of telecommunications policy. It provides 
evidence of a residual tension between national and EU level interests in this respect. 
This has been evident in policy proposals, decision taking and implementation at key 
junctures spanning more than 30 years. The article illustrates the role played at different 
times by key EU and national level governmental, regulatory and commercial actors, in 
particular. Telecommunications, the article argues, thus provides a classic illustration of 
the balance that needs to be struck between supranational and intergovernmental interests 
in the development of communications policies at the EU. Now part of a converging 
electronic communications sector, this feature of telecommunications governance is as 
prominent today as it was in the very early days of EU telecommunications policy 
development of the mid- to late 1980s. 
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European Union Telecommunications Policy  
The Telecommunications sector in Europe: From Stability to Change  
For much of the 20
th
 century, telecommunications was one of the most stable sectors in 
Europe. This stability went hand in hand with a highly distinctive character. 
Telecommunications was considered to be - along with a raft of other sectors, such as 
electricity, gas, water and the railways  - a public utility, stemming from its strong 
network character (Grande 1994).  In economic terms, telecommunications service 
provision was widely viewed as a natural monopoly. The very substantial investment 
costs associated with purchasing the component parts for – and the roll out of – a 
telecommunications network tended to militate against competition, or, more precisely, 
the development of any kind of competitive market structure beyond areas of dense 
population, where revenue streams might be considered to justify market entry. This 
analysis of telecommunication sat alongside an understanding of its strategic significance 
in economically and socially (Humphreys, 1992; Hulsink, 1999). Telecommunication 
was highly valuable to the national economy in terms of the revenue generated from the 
manufacturing and sale of network components, as well as services delivered through the 
network. In secondary terms, the presence of a well-functioning telecommunications 
system was seen as a spur to economic activity more generally: investment, production, 
employment and sales in the economy could be stimulated through a so-called multiplier 
effect. The telecommunication system was also viewed as socially valuable in a number 
of respects (Michalis, 2002; Bauer 2002). It had the potential to enrich the quality of 
personal one-to-one human communication. This was particularly the case for those 
located in sparsely populated areas or at distance from family and friends and could allow 
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public, political, health and security administration of various kinds to function more 
effectively. It is important to understand that whilst the telecommunication sector has 
been transformed in organizational and functional terms, these core staples of the sector 
persist, though understandably in a different articulation due to the passage of time. 
In its original configuration, for most users, telecommunication services amounted to 
voice telephony and, for (some) businesses, simple data communication in the form of 
fax, accessed through relatively simple equipment located at the ends of the network. 
This network was for the most part fixed-link,  that is, it employed a transmission system 
which relied on copper coaxial cables punctuated by switching centres. The economics of 
fixed link telephony in terms of high (dis-incentivising) investment costs, allied to the 
policy goal of achieving progressive network roll out, led, in Europe, to the policy 
solution of publicly owned monopoly or near monopoly (Bartle, 1999). Network 
equipment manufacturing, though more competitive, was little more than oligopolistic in 
nature. To facilitate international communication, European states took their place in the 
International Telecommunication Union, which was the context for the creation of a 
series of bilateral international accounting rates between countries to handle international 
telecommunications traffic (Hills, 2002). 
However, through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the technical characteristics of 
telecommunications changed rapidly as a result of a set of key innovations, aligned to 
convergence with IT and data processing. Central to this was digitalization, which greatly 
enhanced the speed, reliability and security of the network. Digitalisation also meant 
widespread capacity to conduct computer-to-computer communication. The 
telecommunications services palette thus widened to incorporate combinations of voice, 
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data, text and images: so-called value added network services (VANS) (Humphreys and 
Simpson 1996). The extra capacity required for the carriage of these enriched services 
could be provided by optical fibre cable technology, though comprehensive upgrading of 
the network is still a work in progress – and thus a policy challenge - in most, if not all, 
European territories. In addition, mobile (part) microwave based communication emerged 
from the margins of telecommunications, requiring new network roll out. The 
popularization of mobile communication, in which high speed audiovisual services 
accessed through so-called smart phones are now commonly available, has been one of 
the most outstanding changes to have affected a sector which, more broadly, has 
undergone nothing short of a transformation. 
The new telecommunications service possibilities arising from digitalization provided the 
ground for a fundamental re-examination of the structure and operation of 
telecommunication in Europe. Much of the reason for this was practical: there was 
distinct dissatisfaction with the availability (or non-availability as was often the case), 
cost and quality of telecommunications services. Dissatisfaction was particularly strong 
among international business users and was expressed  - not least to governments held 
responsible for the then sectoral structure -  on an individual basis and through user 
representative bodies, such as the International Telecommunications Users Group 
(Simpson, 1992). A particular bugbear was the lack of choice of service provider in the 
publicly owned monopoly system. Strong pressure soon mounted for change in the 
structure of telecommunication service provision to occur given the new technical 
possibilities. A key practical argument was that the economics of new VANS did not 
point to the natural monopoly of the existing system but, rather, suggested the potential 
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efficacy of a competitive service market structure. These developments soon became a 
mutually reinforcing complement to more general political change of a fundamental 
nature in western Europe that emerged through the 1980s and 1990s: the growth of neo-
liberalism (Harvey, 2007). With its immediate origins in the economics of the 
conservative US Right of the late 1970s, the philosophy and strategies of neo-liberalism 
soon gained ground in the UK. In outline, the message of neo-liberalism was simple: a 
philosophical emphasis on individual over group interest cast as liberation and 
empowerment; the rolling back (though not complete eradication) of state influence in 
economic and social life; and, lastly, a view of the market as the superior form for 
organizing economic and (ultimately) social life. For many, the pre-dominance of neo-
liberalism and market relations extends into most, if not all, aspects of social life, not 
least culture (Freedman, 2014). In practical terms, for its advocates, telecommunications 
presented as a tailor-made case to introduce neo-liberal reforms. The sector was state run. 
It was highly uncompetitive but technological change in certain of its key parts appeared 
suggested the amenability of introducing competition. Elsewhere, modest competition 
could be engineered as a starting point in line with the orientation of the neo-liberal 
approach towards marketization (Jordana, 2002; Steinfield 1994).  
In the UK, the forerunner economy of telecommunications policy change across the EU, 
radical change in the ordering of telecommunications thus ensued (Bartle, 2002). The 
incumbent telecommunications operator was partly - and then completely - privatized and 
a competitor service provider introduced. New licences were awarded to companies to 
provide VANS. A nascent mobile communications market was created through the 
licensing of a duopoly of network operators and, thence, a raft of service providers. A 
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new independent national regulatory authority, in the form of the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL), since 2003 called the Office of Communications 
(OFCOM), was created to set in place, enforce and develop a regulatory framework for 
the functioning of a competitive telecommunications market in the UK. The prototypical 
ground had now been set for a neo-liberalised and radically reformed telecommunications 
policy model in Europe. This model was soon emulated, though far from replicated 
wholesale, across the rest of Europe, and beyond (Thatcher 1999; Werle, 1999; Simpson 
and Wilkinson 2002). As this complex process unfolded through the late 1980s and 
1990s, a key a player emerged in the form of the European Union: EU 
telecommunications policy was born. 
The Emergence of EU Telecommunications Policy: Rationale Building and Political 
Controversy  
Indeed, it was in considerable part the complexity, uncertainty and radically different 
approach to the organization and functioning of telecommunications that the 1980s 
heralded which presented itself as an opportunity for the EU to increase  - what was until 
then -  a relatively marginal involvement in telecommunications policy, such was its 
national-centricity. A number of key elements combined to explain the emergence and 
growth of the EU as an actor in telecommunications. It is important to note that in a 
territory as varied as the EU  - even with its by today’s standards small number of 12 
Member States (there are at the time of writing 28 EU Members, prior to ‘Brexit’) – 
policy change in telecommunications was developing at different speeds and to different 
extents at the national level. The EU found an opportunity, and was seen as important in 
delivering, a coordinative role in  the emergence of a regulated market liberal 
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telecommunications space across most of Europe (Roy, 2002). However, as exemplified 
in the next section, the EU did much more than play the role of a policy coordinator and 
facilitator. In fact, at a number of key junctures, the EU can be recognised as something 
of a policy leader or entrepreneur (Cram, 1994). Combining its policy leadership, 
coordinative and facilitatory roles required significant political skill and awareness – 
which was predominantly, though not always, in evidence -  particularly at junctures of 
forward policy movement and resistance to change. Here, a strong feature of the 
evolution of EU telecommunications policy has been an effort to strike an acceptable 
balance between a range of different national interests. Related to this has been the need 
to secure agreement between the EU’s main institutions that have been involved in 
telecommunications policy development: the European Commission (the EU’s civil 
service which consults and proposes new policy initiatives); the European Council of 
Ministers (containing political appointees from the national Member States to vote on 
proposals produced by the European Commission); and the European Parliament 
(containing directly elected members from the EU’s member states which votes on 
decisions made by the European Council of Minsters). 
A raft of highly important economic issues also contributed to a rationale for the 
widening and deepening of the EU’s involvement in telecommunications policy. In the 
late 1980s, there was a growing emphasis on the international nature and potential of 
telecommunications. However, given its history, understanding the implications of a 
potentially open international telecommunications services market was challenging. The 
EU, which amounted to a considerable part of the global market, was viewed by many – 
particularly the larger EU economies and their telecommunications operators  - as a 
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useful staging post to gaining a foothold in the international potential of the 
telecommunications (Schneider, 2002). EU member states had been part of a (far from 
completely developed) common market since 1957, which set important ground for the 
consideration of telecommunications as a more competitive Europeanised sector. In this 
environment, from a customer perspective, a more open, common European market could 
deliver the neo-liberal promises of lower prices and improved service quality. However, 
whilst cross-Member state market integration in telecommunications was certainly a 
possibility, it was an open question about the extent to which this could be achieved 
(Michalis, 2004). 
Beyond economics, there were also political reasons underpinning the interest in 
developing telecommunications as an EU policy area. First, in both politically symbolic 
and practical consumerist terms, enhanced policy cooperation in telecommunications had 
the potential to ‘make Europe a smaller place’ through easier, cheaper cross EU 
communications. Tied in with this was the opportunity to add telecommunications to the 
portfolio of industries which were characterized by strong European integration in 
economic terms. Historically one of the most unlikely candidates for such a move, legal 
measures could be devised at the EU level that set out the parameters of a more 
liberalized  and potentially integrated European telecommunications market. This 
process, in turn, presented opportunities at the EU institutional level, particularly for the 
European Commission, though also to a lesser extent the European Parliament. The 
Commission’s functions and broader political instincts led it to focus on 
telecommunications, which, by the mid-to-late 1980s was regarded as a sector not only 
providing an opportunity for – but rather necessitating even – the development of EU 
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policy activity. Through subsequent decades, the Commission has developed into a key 
telecommunications policy player through liaison with key industry actors, launching 
sector wide consultations, proposal of new legislative measures and recommendations in 
telecommunications for Member States to decide upon; monitoring compliance with 
legislation passed by Member States; and representation of the EU in global fora for the 
negotiation of telecommunications agreements, notably the World Trade Organization. 
Despite this fertile ground for the development of EU telecommunications policy, there 
was at the same time reticence about  - and even opposition to  - potential developments 
in this direction. Across various parts of the EU, there existed ideological opposition to 
neo-liberalism. That telecommunications was considered a tailor made case for reform by 
neo-liberals equally made it a sector tailor made for resistance to such change by its 
opponents. In particular, the long established public service and public interest aspects of 
telecommunications were considered by many to be undermined intrinsically by the 
process of state withdrawal and the introduction of competition and regulation (Simpson, 
2009). The fact that such parameters might be set in place at the EU level pointed 
towards a reduction in the ability of national level actors to resist change in this direction, 
whose messages increasingly were overlaid by an agenda of economic 
internationalization (Ohmae, 1991; Cerny, 1997). This concern was particularly strongly 
felt in smaller member states, even those in general favourably disposed to liberalization 
of telecommunications. Here a distinction is to be drawn between liberalization 
domestically and opening up of the sector to competition internationally, with the risks 
such exposure might bring to indigenous service providers. It was also the case that, even 
among many arch neo-liberals, notably the Conservative government of the late 1980s 
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under Margaret Thatcher, there was deep concern about ceding policy power to the EU 
level. Particular focus was trained on potential institutional growth of the European 
Commission. The potential advantages of the Europeanisation of telecommunications 
through the EU route for these actors needed to be carefully balanced with measures to 
ensure control of the evolution of the sector was maintained predominantly in national 
hands (Thatcher, 2002) . A classic general dilemma of Europeanisation, this is not easy to 
achieve, as the case of telecommunications illustrated well. 
The Establishment of EU Telecommunications Policy: the 1998 Regulatory Package  
The decision to create competition in telecommunications services, through new markets 
with licence-based entry and by opening up existing markets to competition, was a highly 
significant one. That a policy strategy to drive such change through at EU level should 
have developed through the late 1980s and into the next decade was remarkable. 
However, a complex milieu of factors came together over approximately a seven year 
period from 1987-94 to ensure that Member States resolved to do just that. First,  the UK 
and Germany – two of the leading political players in the EU - were forerunner 
telecommunications liberalisers and were keen to see the markets for telecommunications 
terminal equipment and VANS opened to Europe-wide competition (Humphreys, 1992) . 
The UK had even gone further than this by creating competition in voice telephony. By 
the late 1980s, Germany too was of the view that this market could usefully be opened to, 
albeit limited, competition. Second, a strong international business user lobby made its 
voice heard by urging strongly for the opening of telecommunications services to 
competition at EU level. Within the institutional corridors of the EU, the European 
Commission had become emboldened enough to present proposals for the creation of a 
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Single European Market in Telecommunications through a Green Paper (European 
Commission 1987) whose liberalization and Europeanisation thrust chimed with a 
broader Single Market project that was under way at the time across the EU (European 
Commission 1986). Sensing strong opposition to the idea of liberalization of voice 
telephony, the Commission nevertheless signaled its intention to propose the 
liberalization of telecommunications terminal equipment and VANS. It was acutely 
aware, however, that liberalizing legislation in the form of directives in these areas would 
be subject to enough opposition in the Council of Ministers to make their passage into 
law impossible. However, displaying an audacious policy entrepreneurial role, the 
Commission invoked the then article 90 of the Treaty of Rome (now article 86 of the 
Treaty on European Union) and, specifically, a clause within it which the Commission 
claimed required it to put in place directly necessary measures to remove the existence of 
positions of dominance held by public undertakings in relevant markets. The Commission 
argued that the PTTs in Member States, which were at least partly publicly owned, were 
abusing their position in respect of article 90 in the markets for the sale of 
telecommunications terminal equipment and VANS. As a consequence, it released two 
liberalizing directives (European Commission 1988; European Commission 1990) in 
these areas which would require when implemented open EU wide competition. The 
ensuing period was the most controversial one in the history of EU telecommunications 
policy. It had two key components: a fascinating lead up to a ‘liberalisation tipping point’  
and a debate on the extent to which the European Commission  - an unelected body - 
might be allowed to introduce legislation whose process directly bypassed the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament (the latter at that stage merely had a consultative 
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role in respect of Council of Ministers decisions).   
A legal challenge to the Terminal Equipment Directive was issued by France, as well as 
three other separate challenges to the services directive by, respectively, Spain, Belgium 
and Italy. However, a process of negotiation between the Commission and Member 
States through 1989-90 ensued which removed the political controversy from the 
Commission proposals (Humphreys and Simpson, 2005).  
The solution manifested itself in what became known as the Open Network Provision 
compromise, where Member States agreed to open up all telecommunications services to 
competition except public voice telephony and basic data transmission services. A key 
feature of the compromise was freedom granted to Member States to put in place public 
service obligations - which nevertheless needed to be in line with EU competition rules -
on private service providers which leased lines from the incumbent on the public 
network. By this stage, all Member States, however reluctantly, had come to the 
realization that liberalization of telecommunications services was inevitable and even 
desirable. Nonetheless, it was clearly argued that liberalization should not be allowed to 
sweep away the public service element that was so strong in the evolution of 
telecommunications. It became clear also to Member States that liberalization of 
telecommunications services would require a separation of the operational and regulatory 
functions of their telecommunications administrations, though this was never expressly 
required by EU legislation. Beyond this, creating competition in an historically 
monopolist dominated network services environment would require the putting in place 
of a raft of regulatory measures to ensure acceptably fair levels of access to the network 
to provide services competitively. Thus, the era of independent publicly regulated, 
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competitively ordered telecommunications services in the EU was born (Steinfeld et al., 
1994; Thatcher, 1999).  
In conjunction with the passage of the liberalizing Telecommunications Services 
Directive, the EU also put in place, through the standard (not article 90) legislative 
process, a key directive on Open Network Provision. This directive was structured as a 
harmonizing framework in which Member States agreed to put in place service 
stipulations which would allow network service provider inter-operability, as well as to 
create a technical committee to liaise with a range of parties from network operators, 
equipment manufacturers, users and the Commission to ensure that the directive was 
implemented effectively. The ONP directive was a key part of a pivotal process in the 
evolution of EU telecommunications policy. It ‘took the heat’ out of use of article 90 by 
the European Commission. By the time that the European Court of Justice had issued a 
final judgement in respect of the article 90 cases in front of it which, remarkably, 
endorsed the procedural right of the Commission to use article 90, a liberalization tipping 
point had been reached at EU level.  Yet equally, the Commission also realized the limits 
to which it was able to mount challenges of this kid to Member States. The policy idea of 
ensuring balance between the national and EU level had thus been ensconced in EU 
telecommunications policy. The ONP directive was also highly significant in that it 
paved the way for the passage at EU level of a raft of directives which specified the 
harmonization of key parameters of the neo-liberal telecommunications model, such as 
licensing, interconnection and, as a public service counterweight, universal service 
(Goodman, 1996).  
Once the liberalization tipping point had been reached, the EU telecommunications 
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regulatory package developed quickly through the 1990s. Following a comprehensive 
Telecommunications Services Review in 1992, EU Member States took the step to agree 
to open up all public voice telephonic services by 1998 (European Council of Ministers 
1993). Following this, in 1994, in the light of a key report Europe and the Global 
Information Society (European Commission, 1994), also known as the Bangemann 
Report after the Committee’s Chair, Martin Bangemann, Member States agreed to 
liberalize  all telecommunications infrastructures  by the beginning of 1998 in line with 
voice service liberalisation (European Council of Ministers 1994). According to 
Humphreys and Simpson (2005), a number of factors can explain this dramatic series of 
policy developments. First, telecommunications was developing into a global industry 
where national protectionism was viewed as increasingly outmoded. Second, the former 
PTT incumbents of the larger EU economies, many now newly corporatized or partially 
privatized, were hungry to pursue commercial opportunities beyond their national 
territories. Third, even among smaller member states, whose commercial players were 
unlikely to benefit from international expansion, the lower consumer prices and quality of 
service improvements witnessed in early liberalizing states, notably the UK, was a 
significant factor in them agreeing to liberalization. It is also the case that the EU was 
able to serve as a useful ‘policy alibi’ for those states facing opposition to change 
domestically. Thus, the emergence and development of the EU telecommunications 
regulatory framework, as it came to be known, was the result of a combination of 
national and European level factors in the context of a changing techno-economic 
telecommunications context.  
By 1998, therefore, through the passage of a battery of legislative measures, the ground 
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was set for a broadly re-regulated EU telecommunications sector to begin operation. 
These directives were of two characteristic kinds: six liberalizing (enacted through article 
90 (now article 86) and 6 harmonizing (enacted through articles 100a (now 95) related to 
the establishment of the internal market in the EU; and article 66 (now 55) which refers 
to the freedom to provide services across the EU). Central to the establishment of 
liberalized telecommunications markets in the EU were the 1996 Full Competition 
Directive (European Commission, 2006), the 1997 Interconnection Directive (European 
Parliament and Council 1997a), and the 1997 Authorisation and Licences Directive 
(European Parliament and Council 1997b), as well as the 1997 Universal Services 
Directive (European Parliament and Council, 1997c) which provided a service public 
balance to a re-regulation of telecommunications across Europe, under the aegis of the 
EU, that was strongly liberalizing in thrust. 
Policy Implementation and Refinement: Media Convergence and the Electronic 
Communications Regulatory Framework  
The setting in place a comprehensive policy framework at EU level for the re-regulation 
of telecommunications was for, the European Commission, the culmination of a ten year 
project (European Commission, 1998a). However, though a crucial landmark, in reality 
setting the policy framework at EU level was only a relatively early stage in the evolution 
of EU telecommunications policy. An important series of developments and refinements 
of the regulatory framework has occurred. The features of this process have thus 
continued to set the character of EU telecommunications policy.  
A key characteristic has been an almost constant monitoring of the performance of the 
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framework by the European Commission, in line with one of its core responsibilities and 
competences. Monitoring of the extent of compliance of Member States in the 
transposition and implementation of the Directives of the framework has been prominent 
in a series of annual implementation reports. The Commission has also been keen to 
monitor the state of competition in the different national markets of the EU and the 
reasons behind, in particular, evidence of limited competition. This activity has amounted 
to a very large information gathering and processing exercise in which the Commission 
has relied heavily on the series of independent, publicly resourced National Regulatory 
Authorities in telecommunications which were established at the Member State level. It is 
important to note that none of the liberalizing or harmonising legislation passed at EU 
level required Member States to set up these authorities (Thatcher, 2004a), though such 
moves were an inevitable corollary of the commitment to removing operational and 
regulatory control from the former PTT incumbents, as well as to police an increasingly 
complex system of market regulation.  
This monitoring process was supplemented by a series of broader consultation and stock-
taking exercises which have led successively to the proposal by the European 
Commission of changes to the regulatory framework. A key landmark occurred in 2002 
with the proposal by the Commission, duly accepted by Member States, of a very 
significant streamlining of the regulatory framework. Prior to this, a major debate 
occurred on the future regulation of communications at EU level in the context of 
ongoing processes of media convergence (Levy, 1999). Telecommunications is now a 
fundamentally important part of a converging media world where distinctions between 
IT, telecommunications, broadcasting and publishing have become increasingly blurry. 
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Media convergence is a long standing  and complex process enabled by the digitalisation 
of telecommunications and then mass communication broadcasting. The popularization 
of the Internet from the mid-1990s created a new online context within which voice, data 
and image based communication has developed in unprecedentedly integrative ways. For 
EU telecommunications policy makers, media convergence has, at times, presented 
opportunities to establish and develop telecommunications policy. Early on, the changing 
economics of telecommunications services enabled by the growth of VANS provided a 
context for the EU to forge ahead with the liberalization of telecommunications services. 
The idea of convergence has also been symbolically important for the EU with its 
connotations of change in the direction of ‘coming together’. The European Commission 
has, at key moments in the development of its telecommunications policy package, 
adopted aspects of the discourse of convergence to advocate policy change. This has 
involved calls to action to its Member States to address areas related to convergence 
where the EU is seen to be lagging behind in, as well as pointing up the opportunities 
from media convergence around the Internet, in particular. However, on the other hand, 
grappling with media convergence in policy terms has highlighted the political 
limitations of the EU as a setting for telecommunications policy. This was particularly 
evident in the late 1990s when the Commission launched a policy drive to create a more 
convergent regulatory framework for media at EU level, which, at its most ambitious, 
would have covered broadcasting, IT, publishing and telecommunications (European 
Commission 1997).  The Commission’s move precipitated a period of controversy which 
illustrated two key problems for the EU in the pursuit of a broader and deeper media 
policy based on convergence (Simpson, 2000). First, there was strong opposition from 
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the broadcasting sector to moves which would regulate more commonly broadcasting and 
other forms of electronic communication per se. Since the 1990s, this has lessened, not 
least because of the gravitation of broadcasting players, to a significant degree, towards 
the Internet, though it is clear that complete convergence of broadcasting with other 
forms of electronic communication is still some distance away.  Second, the historically 
national centredness of broadcasting regulation across the EU meant strong resistance to 
the transference of regulatory sovereignty over media content to the supranational level. 
This has been a persistence feature  – and impediment to the deepening – of EU 
broadcasting policy for more than three decades. 
The upshot of the EU’s policy engagement with convergence of the late 1990s, though 
politically sobering for the European Commission, was, nevertheless, significant for the 
further development of its telecommunications policy. In essence, telecommunications 
provided ‘face saving’ convergence policy development for the EU. Here, a new 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework was agreed and came into force in 
2003.  Strongly connotative of convergence through its title, the ECRF was, in fact 
telecommunications policy centric in character. Specifically, the new framework covered 
the regulation of all electronic communications infrastructures but not content beyond 
that already contained in the 1998 telecommunications regulatory framework. Excluded 
specifically at that point were broadcast content and so-called Information Society 
services. This referred to content services of any kind offered through the Internet. Since 
this point, the telecommunications policy package has developed under the electronic 
communications mantle (Michalis, 2004b).  
The 2003 regulatory package dramatically reduced the number of sector specific 
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regulatory measures in telecommunications from 20 to 7. A key objective was to 
incorporate a regulatory convergence perspective to all electronic communications 
network infrastructure and associated services: the new framework covered fixed and 
mobile telecommunications networks, cable TV infrastructures,  terrestrial broadcast 
networks and Internet infrastructure. The revised framework comprised two liberalizing 
measures: a Regulation on local loop unbundling introduced in 2000 (European 
Parliament and Council 2000) in response to a perceived stubborn lack of network 
competition in the so-called ‘last mile’ of the network; and a new competition directive 
(European Commission 2002). It also contained  harmonization directives concerning 
matter such asaccess and interconnection (European Parliament and Council 2002a), 
authorization (European Parliament and Council 2002b), universal service (European 
Parliament and Council 2002c) and data protection and privacy (European Parliament 
and Council 2002d), as well as a Framework directive (European Parliament and Council 
2002e). 
A major feature of the evolution of EU telecommunications policy has been the attempt 
by the European Commission to secure Member States’s agreement to create a regulatory 
body at the European level in telecommunications. This became a particularly significant 
issue for the Commission as evidence suggested persistent difficulties in securing the 
degree of regulatory harmonization necessary for the pursuit of a genuine Single 
European Market in telecommunications (Bartle, 2001). Such efforts were bound in with 
an evident desire on the Commission’s part to gain more direct influence in the regulation 
of telecommunications markets across the EU.  As part of the process leading to the 
creation of the ECRF in 2003, the Commission proposed -  and was successful in 
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securing agreement to create -  the Communications Committee, which effectively 
replaced the existing ONP and licensing committees and was comprised of Member State 
telecommunications appointees. However, the Commission also proposed, 
unsuccessfully, the creation of a High Level Communications Group in which it would 
have played a pivotal decision making role alongside NRAs (Michalis, 2004b). The 
European Regulators Group emerged from this policy deliberation as a compromise 
solution. Replacing the High Level Regulators Group established in the 1998 Regulatory 
Framework, the ERG was comprised of NRAs and the Commission, the latter present in a 
non-voting capacity. The purpose of the ERG was to facilitate coordination between 
NRAs, in particular to ensure as much commonality as possible in the implementation of 
the telecommunications regulatory framework. A key aspect of the ERG was its 
secretariat, resourced by the Commission. The ERG marked the formal 
institutionalization of a committee of NRAs at EU level.  
The persistence of the Commission and the securing of policy compromise in the context 
of an ongoing struggle between the national and EU levels for regulatory power in 
telecommunications are key features of the evolution of the EU policy environment. The 
latter was particularly evident in the Commission’s desire to secure for itself a veto over 
certain key regulatory decisions taken at the national level. An example was a proposal to 
allow it, through a legally binding Decision, to specify telecommunications sub-markets 
that would be subject to sector specific regulatory measures. Similarly, any proposed 
market regulation in additional areas desired by Member States would have to secure the 
Commission’s agreement. Member State opposition to this proposal was, unsurprisingly 
strong and resulted in a downgrading of the Commission’s input to the status of a non 
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legally binding Recommendation derived after public and NRA based consultation. 
Another example centred on a debate, in the lead up to the agreement of the 2003 ECRF, 
on a potential veto for the Commission on NRA decisions to remove ex ante regulation 
from a particular sub-market. After much often fractious exchange, it was agreed that the 
Commission could only exercise the power of veto here in the event of there being a 
European dimension to the decision (Telecom Markets, 18.12.01: 5). Thus, Article 7 of 
the ECRF’s Framework Directive allowed the Commission to veto decisions about which 
operators exercised SMP in specified markets and also in relation to markets not 
identified by the Commission as needing sector specific regulation. The NRAs also met 
as part of a more informal,  pan-European Independent Regulators Group, separate from 
the EU policy apparatus, which was in part indicative of their desire to exercise epistemic 
interaction outside the presence of the Commission (Humphreys and Simpson, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the idea of creating a stronger EU level telecommunications regulatory 
authority persisted in the mind of the Commission and surfaced strongly in 2007 as part 
of a review of the ECRF. A proposal for a Regulation to create a new such body was 
issued by the Commission, justified by the view that there was persistent evidence of 
inconsistent regulatory practice, leading to unfair competition in telecommunications 
across the EU. The Commission held the loose coordination among NRAs which existed 
in the ERG as an impediment to this. Instead, the proposed new body would have had a 
much greater supranational dimension in which the influence of the Commission would 
have been stronger. An Administrative Board with members appointed by the European 
Council of Ministers and the Commission in equal measure would have sat above and 
overseen the  new body’s Board of Regulators, comprising the EU NRAs. The work of 
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the new body was to be used by the Commission to inform it in respect of decisions it 
would take related to its veto powers already held and, more importantly, a new right of 
veto - which the Commission sought in its proposals for revision of the ECRF – related to 
the regulatory remedies specified by NRAs in respect of identified problems in national 
telecommunications markets.  The latter proposal was firmly rejected by Member States 
in the agreed revisions to the ECRF, albeit that the new procedure did give the 
Commission more objection-raising and discursive scope to disagree with remedies 
produced by NRAs (Simpson, 2011). 
The proposal for the new regulatory body would have created significant 
supranationalisaton of EU telecommunications policy making, within which the 
European Commission’s policy power would have grown considerably. It was 
unsurprising that this proposal met with strong opposition from NRAs, but adverse 
reaction was strong also from the European Parliament. The latter produced a counter-
proposal in which the Commission’s proposed Administrative Board would be absent 
from the new regulatory body, with only one third of its budget coming from EU 
resources. Despite its supranational character, it is interesting that the EP declared its 
wish to see a regulatory system underpinned by subsidiarity and minus any kind of 
supranational European regulatory agency, something it feared would be the consequence 
of the Commission’s proposal. After considerable deliberation, the European Council of 
Ministers and the EP agreed on the creation of the Body of European Regulators in 
Electronic Communications to replace the ERG. BEREC is essentially 
intergovernmentalist in nature, being a forum for cooperation among NRAs, through its 
Board of Regulators, very much akin to the ERG. A major difference, though, providing 
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a Europeanised character to the new body, was the establishment of the BEREC office, 
an administrative arm, as a formal, legally established, Community body with legal, 
administrative and financial autonomy (European Parliament and Council, 2009a: 2; 
Simpson 2011).  
Current Policy Challenges of Convergence and the Future of European Union 
Telecommunications Policy  
The current phase of EU telecommunications policy – like the electronic media 
environment as whole - continues to be influenced strongly by matters of media 
convergence.  A thorny issue here has been the relevance to EU telecommunications of 
Internet (or Net) Neutrality (Wu, 2003). Net Neutrality first emerged as a high profile 
issue in negotiations that led to the revision of the EU’s ECRF, begun in 2006.  The 
upshot was the inclusion of an appendix to 2009 Better Regulation Directive (European 
Parliament and Council 2009) which contained a Declaration on Net Neutrality, 
formulated by the European Commission. The ECRF allows Member States to act against 
discriminatory action taken by ISPs in respect of content. The Commission addressed Net 
Neutrality further in a 2013  proposal in the broader area of the single market in 
electronic communication, something which proved controversial. A particular concern 
centred on the extent to which the EU would allow so-called paid prioritisation for 
Internet services. In October 2015, the European Parliament voted in favour of new Net 
Neutrality regulations (European Parliament and Council, 2015) which epitomise the 
policy tightrope which the EU tends to have to walk in respect of the more controversial 
aspects of electronic communications regulation related to the ECRF. Specifically, going 
forward, the Regulation allows Member States to stipulate the provision of what are 
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termed guaranteed-quality services. It is important to note that services related to Internet 
access are not included in this term. Once the legislation is enacted, these services will 
only be permitted by NRAs if it is deemed that the network is sufficiently capacious to 
allow them to exist in a way that does not cause detriment to the provision of Internet 
services to other users.  
The intertwined elements of telecommunications and the pursuit of a common market 
across the EU were re-articulated strongly in 2015, when the European Commission 
declared the goal of creating A Connected Digital Single Market (European Commission, 
2015) with specific mention of the need to address fragmentation in telecommunications 
regulation. In May, it issued a Communication on the creation of a European Digital 
Single Market with three key goals: improved access to online goods and services; the 
creation of appropriate conditions to see the future growth of digital networks and 
services; and maximization the growth of the European digital Economy (European 
Commission 2015). As part of the action lines associated with the pursuit of these goals  - 
and in by now a very familiar fashion - the Commission launched a review of the 
telecommunications regulatory framework in July.  Here, it noted key changes which had 
occurred since its last review, placing particular emphasis on the broad and highly costly 
process of upgrading of network infrastructure; the convergence of fixed and mobile 
communication networks; the emergence online of vertically integrated, convergent so-
called Over-The-Top (OTT) service providers; and the strong rise in demand for wireless 
data from consumers (European Commission 2015:1).  OTT service providers, which do 
not operate according to the same regulations as telecommunications service providers, 
yet whose services appear increasingly substitutable with traditional electronic 
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communications services, such as voice telephony, were singled out for particular 
attention. Relatedly, in June 2015, the European Parliament and European Council of 
Ministers reached agreement on a 2013 proposal from the European Commission to take 
measures to deliver a so-called Connected Continent.  
In launching its 2015 review, the Commission noted a number of areas of concern. Here, 
whilst the regulatory framework to date was viewed as  having ensured that ‘markets 
operate more competitively, bringing lower prices and better quality of service to 
consumers and businesses, it can be questioned as to whether it has sufficiently promoted 
the transition towards high capacity Next Generation Access  (NGA) networks fit to meet 
future needs’ (European Commission 2015: 3).  Whilst noting that some market 
integration had occurred, it was still the case that ‘progress is slow and the provision of 
connectivity to business and consumers remains highly fragmented and diverse across the 
Union’.  The Commission was also directly critical of what it described as ‘the 
institutional set up’ in the EU, making reference to both NRAs and BEREC, though not 
specifying any details (ibid). These issues would be addressed through a review 
examining what was described as the three pillars of the EU regulatory framework for 
telecommunications related, respectively, to networks, services and governance. 
The first stage of the review was a by now familiar consultation exercise, where the 
Commission invited views on the regulatory framework and potential changes to it 
according to three pillars:  network regulation in order to ensure appropriate levels of 
investment in fixed and mobile infrastructure; services regulation to cater for a growing 
environment of diverse online services; and the operation of the regulatory framework 
consistently in national telecommunications markets, in particular in respect of the 
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increasingly important matter of spectrum. The current review is absent a consideration 
of the important matter of roaming, which has been dealt with separately through an EU 
Regulation aimed reducing the cost to consumers of using their suite of domestic mobile 
communications services whilst abroad (European Parliament and Council 2012; 2015). 
A key issue for the EU going forward is the regulation of spectrum, where convergence 
figures prominently. Here, the coming together of fixed and mobile communications 
platforms raises concerns about securing appropriate levels of interfacing at the 
infrastructural level, clearly within the remit of the existing EU regulatory framework. 
Beyond this, at the content and services provision and consumption level, the dramatic 
growth in on-the-move online services has called forth a debate about the extent to which 
current allocations of spectrum might need to be changed. This debate has been carried 
out largely separate from discussions of the telecommunications regulatory framework. 
In particular, the mobile communications industry has pressed hard for a reallocation of 
key parts of the spectrum away from broadcasting and broadcast related uses towards 
mobile communication. The so-called digital dividend has provided an initial context for 
and stimulus to this debate. Such pressures from the mobile communication industry have 
met with resistance from established spectrum tenants from the broadcasting sector. 
Discussions have also centred on ways in which the current allocation and use of 
available spectrum might be made more efficient in the light of technological changes. In 
launching its review, the Commission raised spectrum as a convergence underpinned 
infrastructural matter with a European dimension. Here, it questioned whether a more 
harmonized approach to the allocation might need to be developed across the EU. 
Equally, it entered the debate on potential spectrum reallocation from an infrastructural 
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perspective by raising matters related to so-called spectrum sharing where ‘the combined 
net socio-economic benefit of multiple applications sharing a band is greater than the net 
socio-economic benefit of a single application’ (European Commission 2015:).  
In March 2016, the Commission provided an initial informal analysis of the results of its 
consultation. A key concern of former telecommunications incumbents is that the system 
of regulated competition has sacrificed long term investment for short term market based 
outcomes. It is also clear that there is likely to be a feisty debate between 
telecommunications operators and so-called OTT companies over whether the latter 
should be regulated in the same fashion (Michalis, 2016) as the former given the potential 
substitutability of the services provided by both. Predictably, there was evidence of a 
difference of opinion among the range of respondents about changes to the framework, 
suggesting that the future of EU telecommunications is likely to be at least as contested 
as its past. 
 
Historiography: European Union Telecommunications Policy  
The emergence of the EU to prominence as an actor in telecommunications has been one 
of the more remarkable developments in the international communication policy 
landscape of the last 30 years. As such, explaining its evolution and development has 
garnered considerable attention from a number of communication policy scholars. 
Conceptual contributions to understanding EU telecommunications policy can be 
grouped into three inter-related areas: understanding the relative influence of the EU and 
national levels in policy development; changes in the international political economy and 
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telecommunications; and the evolving nature of EU telecommunications regulatory 
governance. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the key concerns of academic research on EU telecommunications 
policy has been to understand the relative influence exerted by the national and EU 
levels, respectively, on policy development. Scholars such as Mark Thatcher (1999; 
2001; 2004) and Ian Bartle (1999; 2004) have emphasized the importance of national 
level economic and political interests in the development of EU telecommunications 
policy. Here, national level political actors, in particular, are seen to be central to the 
creation of policy at EU level and its evolution. Thus, policy outcomes are primarily the 
product of agreements between different national interests and reflect the exertion of 
preferences and the securing of compromise in classic intergovernmental fashion. An 
equally important dimension of this research highlights the ability of the national level to 
download and absorb policy agreed at EU level through policy filters and the political 
modus operandi characteristic of national level interests.  
Other early research on the emergence of the EU, given its remarkable and swift rise to 
prominence through the 1980s in telecommunications, placed emphasis on the EU 
institutional level. Here, the EU was viewed as a corporate actor  (Schneider et al 1994) 
driving policy forward in key instances independent of national member state interests. In 
this process, the supportive role played by telecommunications business interests has 
been emphasized in a generally neo-pluralistic policy landscape of the kind characterized 
by much earlier by Lindblom (1977). Other research at this time emphasized the 
importance of the growth and relative power of the EU level (Sandholtz, 1993; 1998). As 
EU telecommunications policy has matured, research has emphasized the complex 
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interplay between the national and EU levels in decision-making and policy 
implementation (Michalis, 2004; Humphreys and Simpson 2005; Goodman 2006). Bartle 
(2002) notes the way the EU provided a policy alibi for Member States in the 
implementation of EU telecommunications policy legislation. Other research has 
emphasized the way in which the European Commission has drawn on its competition 
policy powers to make interventions in telecommunications policy (Schneider and Werle, 
1990; Schmidt 1998). This was evident in the late 1990s in the Commission’s position 
that it would approve a France Telecom: Deutsche Telekom proposed joint venture, 
known as Atlas, related to the provision of international leased lines and services, only if 
Germany and France agreed to the liberalization of so-called alternative 
telecommunications infrastructures (Schmidt, 1997, 1998). The Commission has also 
intervened strongly on competition grounds to oppose the provision of so-called 
‘regulatory holidays’ for incumbent providers to allow them to invest in network 
infrastructure (Simpson 2009). 
The telecommunications sector has attracted considerable research from scholars 
interested in changes in the international political economy. Here, the influence of neo-
liberal globalization and its relationship to  - and implications for -  the national level in 
telecommunications have garnered particular attention. Classic features of 
telecommunications policy change highlighted in this article: liberalisation; creation of 
new markets; state withdrawal through (partial) privatization; and the creation of new 
public regulatory authorities at the national level  resonate with the growth of the neo-
liberal regulatory state (Seidman and Gilmour 1986) and internationally, the European 
regulatory state (Majone 1994; 1996; 1997). The manifestation of a regulatory state in 
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telecommunications at the national level in the UK and Germany has been addressed by 
Bartle et al. (2002) and Coen et al. (2002).  Belloc, Nicita and Parcu (2012) highlight the 
importance of NRAs in delivering competition in telecommunications at the national 
level. The development of EU telecommunications policy is also seen to have created an 
interplay between the competition state and the regulatory state (Humphreys and 
Simpson 2008). Here, an interesting feature is that the pursuit of competition in 
telecommunications has, ironically required a complex and detailed battery of rules. 
A third major strand of scholarship on EU telecommunications policy aims to 
characterize the kind of governance in evidence in the sector. Here, a focus has been 
placed on the nature of EU legislation and how that reflects the complex relationship 
between between national and EU level interests. Recent work has recognized the role 
and limitations of so-called hard and soft governance entailed in EU policy measures. 
Evidence suggests that in the revised regulatory framework agreed in 2009, the use of 
soft governance measures was prompted by the EU as means of ensuring political 
compromise. Used in this way, the potential deliberative and flexible advantages of soft 
governance are at risk of not being realized (Simpson, 2011). An interesting finding is 
that the usage of both hard and soft governance has been a way of addressing the 
limitations of each if deployed solely (Simpson, 2013). As  EU policy has developed, 
research has focused on the extent to which  networked governance has emerged. Here, 
evidence suggests that a system of cross-nationally linked national regulatory authorities 
facilitated by European level resources has been in operation (Thatcher and Coen, 2008).  
The functioning of this governance network ties in with an analysis of the EU’s attempts 
to create a stronger institutional apparatus for the regulation of telecommunications at the 
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European level and attempts to resist such moves. Humphreys and Simpson (2008) have 
nevertheless characterised a complex regulatory system – a ‘two level pluri-dimensional 
governance order’ -  where the European Commission sits prominently in a devolved and 
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